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FRAMING THE FOURTH 
Tracey Maclin* 
Julia Mirabella** 
The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602–1791. 
By William J. Cuddihy. Oxford and New York: Oxford Press. 2009. Pp. 
lxviii, 940. $165. 
Introduction 
As late as 1988, Fourth Amendment scholars thought they knew all they 
needed to know about the amendment’s history. After all, the right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure is a “made in America” privilege. Un-
like other parts of the Bill of Rights, the protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure “provides us with a rich historical background rooted in 
American, as well as English, experience; it is the one procedural safeguard 
in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events that immediately pre-
ceded the revolutionary struggle with England.”1 The history of search and 
seizure in Britain and America was neatly described in books by Nelson 
Lasson and Jacob Landynski.2 Through these books and related articles, 
scholars learned about the events and individuals that helped prompt the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment. 
Although this history was well known to judges and scholars, in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century Fourth Amendment history rarely mattered 
to the Supreme Court. To be sure, there were disagreements, both on and off 
the Court, regarding the relevance of history. The results in cases, however, 
rarely depended on how the Court interpreted the amendment’s history.3 
Our knowledge of the Fourth Amendment’s history was fundamentally 
transformed when William Cuddihy completed his Ph.D. dissertation in 
1990.4 Cuddihy’s study was the most comprehensive and detailed examina-
tion of the history of search and seizure law and essential reading for anyone 
interested in the amendment’s history. At first, Cuddihy’s work was little 
known: only a few people noticed when the highly regarded constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 ** J.D. Candidate, 2012, Boston University School of Law. 
 1. Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 19 (1966). 
 2. Id.; Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution (Da Capo Press 1970) (1937). 
 3. Professor Sklansky aptly observes that “by the early 1970s the history of the Fourth 
Amendment seemed increasingly beside the point.” David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and 
Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1741 (2000). 
 4. William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning: 602–1791 
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School). 
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historian Leonard W. Levy stated that “Cuddihy is the best authority on the 
origins of the Fourth Amendment.”5 Cuddihy finished his dissertation in 
1990 and it remained unedited, unpublished, and largely unknown for sev-
eral years—until Justice O’Connor made it famous by citing the dissertation 
thirteen times in her Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton dissent.6 Since 
Acton, a reassessment of Fourth Amendment history has been undertaken by 
criminal procedure scholars, and a “portion of the credit or blame may be 
due William Cuddihy.”7 Cuddihy’s work has generated the attention scholars 
dream about—not only was he cited by the Court, his work apparently con-
vinced Justice O’Connor to change “her position on a fundamental issue in 
constitutional law.”8  
A renewed interest in the Fourth Amendment’s history has also been fu-
eled by the rhetoric of Justices Scalia and Thomas. In Wyoming v. 
Houghton,9 Justice Scalia announced that a historical inquiry is the starting 
point for every search and seizure case. Scalia explained that in determining 
whether police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, the Court will first 
decide whether the intrusion “was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure 
under the common law when the Amendment was framed.”10 If the common 
law “yields no answer,” the Court will then decide the validity of the intru-
sion under a modern balancing test.11  
Although Houghton preached a commitment to historical inquiry, the 
Court has not adhered to its rhetoric. Holdings in Fourth Amendment cases 
seldom depend on the Court’s interpretation of history.12 Indeed, as Profes-
sor Larry Yackle notes about the Court’s constitutional rulings, “results turn 
(as they should) on the justices’ own best judgment rather than on anything 
genuinely traceable to original understanding.”13 The Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts, often claiming reliance on the text of the amendment, have applied a 
balancing, “reasonableness” formula to decide search and seizure cases. 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution 441 n.1 
(1988).  
 6. 515 U.S. 646, 669–73 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See Thomas K. Clancy, The 
Role of History, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 811, 813 (2010) (book review) (noting that O’Connor’s 
dissent in Acton made Cuddihy’s dissertation “famous”). Prior to Acton, Cuddihy had caught the 
attention of Justice Brennan, who cited Cuddihy’s master’s thesis, Search and Seizure in Great 
Britain and the American Colonies. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288–89 
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 7. Sklansky, supra note 3, at 1742.  
 8. Morgan Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1707, 1711 (1996). 
 9. 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
 10. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299. 
 11. Id. at 299–300. 
 12. See generally Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 895 (2002).  
 13. Larry Yackle, Regulatory Rights: Supreme Court Activism, The Public Inter-
est, and the Making of Constitutional Law 50 (2007). 
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Interestingly, Cuddihy’s scholarship and conclusions have something to say 
about this approach as well.  
Cuddihy’s dissertation was 1,560 pages long. The book, The Fourth 
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602–1791, published by Ox-
ford University Press in 2009, is now a solid 782 pages, with an additional 
127 pages of appendices. Despite its smaller size, Origins and Original 
Meaning remains a unique resource for anyone interested in the history of 
the Fourth Amendment. A central purpose of Cuddihy’s research is to iden-
tify the types of searches and seizures that “the amendment originally 
embraced as unreasonable or reasonable” (p. lxiv). Beginning his review in 
602, Cuddihy ends his research in 1791 with the ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment, excluding much of the congressional debate and information 
beyond 1791 because he believes it to be unrevealing of the amendment’s 
original intentions (p. lxvii). Over the course of twenty-four chapters, Cud-
dihy documents 1,189 years of political and intellectual development of 
search and seizure law in Britain and the United States. Cuddihy reviewed 
thousands of sources and the breadth of his research is immediately appar-
ent; he has left little out. The details often overwhelm, but the patient reader 
will leave with a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of search and 
seizure history. 
The book has four principal theses. First, Cuddihy finds that the protec-
tion intended by the Fourth Amendment is much broader than the protection 
granted by the Warrant Clause and that this broader protection captures 
many kinds of searches and seizures that the Framers found to be unreason-
able (p. lxvi). Second, Cuddihy documents the emergence of the idea of a 
right against unreasonable search and seizure in Britain from its emergence 
among British intellectuals and through its political development (p. lxvi). 
Third, Cuddihy focuses on the development of the Warrant Clause on Amer-
ican soil, finding that America’s contribution to the development of the 
clause outweighed Britain’s contribution (p. lxvi). Finally, Cuddihy exam-
ines the political context in which the Fourth Amendment’s ideas on search 
and seizure were formed, finding that the “ideas hinged on the character of 
the political and social environments of 1290–1791” (p. lxvii). 
This Review examines some of Cuddihy’s main arguments. Part I high-
lights certain aspects of search and seizure doctrine that Cuddihy finds had a 
consensus by 1791 and briefly looks at other areas that were unsettled. Part 
II describes some of the scholarly reaction that Cuddihy has ignited. Spe-
cifically, it outlines the points of agreement and disagreement between 
Cuddihy and Professors Thomas Davies and Fabio Arcila.14 Finally, Part III 
compares Justice Scalia’s use of history in a recent case with  
Cuddihy’s findings and offers a few comments on the guidance that Cud-
dihy’s book can provide to modern judges. 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Our selection of the scholarship of Davies and Arcila implies no disrespect for the many 
other scholars who have written about the history of the Fourth Amendment. Space limitations pre-
clude consideration of other scholars’ contributions. 
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I. Lessons Learned from History 
A founding principle of Cuddihy’s work is that the Framers’ ideas and 
intentions for the Fourth Amendment were molded by centuries of history 
(p. 734). What emerges is a picture of the gradual development of intellec-
tual and popular movements against general searches in Britain and the 
acceleration of that movement in America in the decade and a half leading 
up to the American Revolution through the framing of the Fourth Amend-
ment in 1791.15 Cuddihy’s research demonstrates that there was no single 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. After reading Cuddihy’s book, however, 
it is possible to separate topics of search and seizure into three categories: 
types of unreasonable searches and seizures that had a concrete consensus 
by 1791, concepts that remained unsettled by 1791, and modern ideas that 
were given very little thought during the framing era.16 
A. Consensus: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
To the extent that there are definitive understandings of the Framers’ in-
tentions, Cuddihy argues they lie mainly in the categories of unreasonable 
search and seizure. By 1791, he finds the Framers had come to a consensus 
that general warrants and searches, multiple specific warrants, nocturnal 
searches, and no-knock entries were considered unreasonable (pp. 739–50).  
1. General Warrants and General Searches 
The general warrant was the “preponderant motivation behind the 
[Fourth A]mendment.”17 The colonial experience with the general search and 
writs of assistance led America to reject the general warrant and replace it 
with the specific warrant. Rejection of the general warrant originated in 
Britain in the late 1600s (p. 268). English legal commentators such as Henry 
Care, Giles Jacob, William Hawkins, and Sir Matthew Hale began advocat-
ing for the replacement of general warrants with specific warrants in areas 
that were of political interest to them (pp. 268–80). Narrow applications for 
the specific warrant resulted in a coexistence of the general and specific 
warrant in Britain through the early 1700s (p. 286). Ironically, by 1760, 
Britain had witnessed the condemnation of the general warrant, but simulta-
neously experienced a “parallel explosion” in the use of general warrants (p. 
286). 
Across the ocean, the colonists had a similar experience with general 
warrants and legislation authorizing general searches: “[d]oor-to-door 
                                                                                                                      
 15. In fact, Cuddihy notes that the “colonists made about as much progress toward [the spe-
cific warrant] in the decade and a half before their revolution as the British had achieved in the 
preceding century and a half.” P. 538. 
 16. Bounded by a word limit, this Review highlights only some of Cuddihy’s findings, the 
result being that many other important topics must be overlooked. 
 17. P. 771. General warrants did not limit searches to designated people, locations, or things. 
They were a “legal pass key to all doors.” P. lxv.  
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searches and mass arrests characterized legislation in the colonies no less 
than in the mother country” (p. 193). Massachusetts began the revolt against 
general warrants and searches as it consistently clashed with Britain over 
excise searches and writs of assistance.18  
In the three decades between 1730 and 1760, Massachusetts witnessed a 
sudden increase in the number of general searches, as applications for gen-
eral searches more than doubled. Searches for small pox, naval 
impressments, impost and customs searches, and searches related to an un-
successful land bank19 were marked by violence and greatly expanded the 
portion of the population that was subjected to promiscuous invasion of their 
homes (pp. 371–73, 357). Sir Edward Randolph, the chief customs agent of 
New England appointed by the Commissioners of Customs in Britain, vig-
orously employed the power of his commission to conduct general searches 
and “flout[ed] the colony’s sensitivities on search and seizure” (p. 353). 
Randolph’s tactics generated discontent in the Bay Colony that was further 
exacerbated by the Excise Act of 1754.  
The Excise Act allowed tax collectors to “interrogate any citizen under 
oath concerning his annual consumption of spirits” (p. 356). While wealthy 
merchants were expected to bear the brunt of the tax, the Excise Act “re-
quired everyone to maintain an account of his family’s annual consumption 
and swear to its veracity if the local excise officer asked” (p. 365). These 
requirements exposed the “entire community . . . to . . . compulsory self-
incrimination” (p. 365). As the last in a line of expanding general searches, 
the Excise Act was the final straw for some colonists. Critics argued that the 
interrogation clause violated “the constitution, Magna Carta, natural rights, 
and ‘that Security which every man enjoys in his own House’ ” (p. 356). 
Although the “[a]pocalyptic rhetoric” against the clause seemed overblown 
because the interrogation clause was less of a threat to privacy than ex offi-
cio searches long administered in the colony, the outrage ignited by the Act 
was due to the fact that “grievances over search and seizure had been accu-
mulating in Massachusetts for over a quarter of a century” (p. 357). 
Furthermore, the “breadth and depth of the opposition to the  
interrogation clause transcended merchants and narrow class interests,” 
broadening the consensus against general searches and seizures (p. 365). 
Reaction to the Excise Act also bred legislation implementing specific  
                                                                                                                      
 18. P. 375. An excise search was a search for items subject to tax. “By 1763, just about eve-
rything a Briton ate, drank, wore, or otherwise consumed was either taxable under the excise or 
recently had been: leather, soap, paper, most alcoholic beverages, coffee, tea, candles, glass, and 
much, much more.” P. 301. A writ of assistance was a court order to individuals to assist customs 
officers in the performance of their duties. Unlike a general warrant, the writ did not authorize a 
search; “[i]t merely vouched for the identity of the customs officers who by their commissions were 
authorized to search.” O. M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in The 
Era of the American Revolution 40, 45 (Richard B. Morris ed., Harper Torchbooks 1975) 
(1939). 
 19. The land bank scheme was never signed into law by Governor William Shirley but had 
proposed using general warrants to “recover the records of the bank’s directors” and allowed 
searches to “break open doors and chests.” P. 359. 
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warrants for impost and customs searches as a way to curb promiscuous 
searches (p. 369). 
Finally, there was the furor over writs of assistance. By 1700, writs of 
assistance were the predominate type of revenue search in Britain. Their use 
was expanded in Massachusetts in the 1760s when Governor William Shir-
ley ordered the customs service to obtain writs of assistance, which allowed 
the customs service to “enter and search all places,” and only expired six 
months after the reigning monarch’s death (p. 363). After the death of King 
George II in October of 1760, “sixty-three members of the ‘Society for 
Promoting Trade and Commerce Within the Province,’ an association of 
prominent merchants from Boston and Salem, asked the Superior Court to 
hear arguments against the writs” (p. 381). James Otis Jr. represented the 
merchants. Otis’s fiery argument in Paxton’s Case made the case a cause 
cèlébre in Massachusetts.20 Otis categorically repudiated general warrants 
and argued for use of the specific warrant as a replacement (p. 391). Al-
though Otis lost his case, the result in Paxton’s Case “intensified public 
antipathy to the writs of assistance” (p. 395). British customs officers found 
themselves unable to carry out searches and seizures because attempts to 
seize goods would bring out mobs of locals who would quickly carry away 
the illegal goods (p. 501).  
Hostility against writs of assistance and general searches spread to other 
colonies with the enforcement of the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767. The 
Townshend Act “empower[ed] . . . the highest court in each colony to issue 
writs of assistance” and was intended to make the issuance of writs of assis-
tance easier on customs officials.21 Instead of obtaining writs with ease, 
however, British customs officials encountered resistance from colonial 
judges. While Massachusetts and New Hampshire had authorized new writs 
before the Act was passed, five other colonies refused to issue them (p. 513). 
In refusing to issue writs, colonial judges employed various tactics: in 
Maryland and South Carolina the courts “ignored rather than refused re-
quests for the writs;” in Rhode Island the Superior Court postponed 
considering the writs “on grounds that two of its members were absent;” and 
in Connecticut the court refused to issue writs “on grounds that [the customs 
officers] had not submitted the formal memorial to the court” that it was 
accustomed to (pp. 513–14). New York’s highest court, which had initially 
agreed to issue writs, reversed its decision between 1769 and 1772 as 
“[j]udges pleaded illness, age, and inclemency of weather for absences that 
precluded a necessary quorum” to order writs (p. 523). While each court had 
different reasons for rejecting them, “[t]he near-uniform defeat of writs of 
assistance in colonial courts signified the beginnings of a dialogue on the 
writs and of a consensus against general warrants by the American judici-
ary” (p. 533). 
                                                                                                                      
 20. For a wonderful study of Paxton’s Case and Otis, see M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assis-
tance Case (1978).  
 21. See p. 506. 
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By the American Revolution, the colonies had had their fill of general 
warrants and general searches. After independence, state constitutions made 
their thoughts on general warrants concrete. In Maryland, there was a repu-
diation of all “general warrants [as] ‘illegal,’ ” while the Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania constitutions “condemned all general warrants as contrary to a 
broader right” (p. 605). The colonies’ extensive, violent, and politicized re-
lationship with the general warrants and writs of assistance had created a 
consensus that general warrants were “the overriding threat to privacy” (p. 
771).  
2. Multiple-Specific Warrants for Location and Arrest 
America’s rejection of the general warrant led to the use of specific war-
rants as a replacement. However, states that adopted the specific warrant did 
not always limit the scope of the search and would use “warrants to inspect 
multiple places” (p. 331). During the revolution states used multiple-specific 
warrants “to arrest persons by the dozen and to search houses for contra-
band” (p. 658). Despite the use of multiple-specific warrants, Cuddihy 
asserts that by 1791 the tide turned against their use with American legal 
treatises, state legislation, federal legislation, and a textual interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment supporting particularity (pp. 740–41).  
American legal treatises supporting specific warrants limited those war-
rants to single locations (p. 740). During the 1780s, the states enacted 
legislation requiring specific warrants. Massachusetts led the way shifting 
from “multiple-specific search warrants to warrants designating a single 
dwelling house, and finally, to warrants specifying individual stores as well 
as dwellings” (p. 659). Rhode Island, Delaware, and Virginia followed suit 
(p. 659). Federal legislation also lent support for the unreasonableness of 
multiple-specific warrants. The Collection Act of 1789 required all federal 
search warrants to specify a single location, “a house, store ‘or other place’ ” 
(p. 741). Finally, the language of the Fourth Amendment, with the words 
“particular” and “place,” indicated a restriction on multiple-specificity (pp. 
741–42).  
3. Nocturnal Searches and No-Knock Entries 
Along with a consensus that general warrants, writs of assistance, and 
multiple specific warrants were unreasonable came agreement that certain 
techniques of search and seizure were also unreasonable. In particular, Cud-
dihy finds that by 1791 there was no tolerance for nocturnal searches or no-
knock, forcible entries among the American states. 
Opposition to nocturnal searches emerged as early as 1333 in Britain, 
and by the early 1600s, commentators such as Sir Matthew Hale were  
discouraging nocturnal searches (pp. 413, 661). But resistance to the noc-
turnal search did not translate into restrictions across all search and seizure 
law. In the colonies, “nocturnal searches remained the norm” until the 1690s 
(p. 428). Over the next century, however, American thinking regarding  
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nocturnal searches evolved from acceptance to “an almost categorical ex-
tinction of official entry at night” (p. 661). 
The evolution was incremental and no state abolished all nocturnal en-
tries (p. 748). Furthermore, Cuddihy notes that the unconstitutionality of 
nocturnal searches was implicit in the legislation passed during the framing 
era (p. 748). Legislation covering gaming, poaching, smuggling, and ammu-
nition storage gradually incorporated daytime restrictions and by 1782, 
“statutes of all of the states except . . . Delaware generally forbade searches 
at night” (pp. 748, 661). The Collection and Excise Acts of 1789 and 1791 
also permitted daytime-only searches, “even warrantless searches of distill-
eries” (p. 748). The breadth of legislation restricting searches to daylight 
hours leads Cuddihy to conclude that “the hidden unconstitutionality of noc-
turnal searches was the most certain feature of the amendment’s original 
understanding” (p. 748). 
By 1791, there was also a consensus on the unreasonableness of no-
knock entries in both colonial legislation and custom. “Every legal manual 
for American justices of the peace between 1788 and 1791 forbade unan-
nounced, forcible entry to accomplish an arrest” and statutes restricted 
forcible entry unless a household refused to admit searchers or there were 
“necessary” circumstances. (p. 749). At least ten states had statutes restrict-
ing no-knock entries and the only applicable federal law, the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, required officers to adhere to the legal requirements of the states 
when engaging in a search or seizure.22  
Thus, according to Cuddihy’s research, the right embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment “reveals a depth and complexity that transcend” the textual 
prohibition “against unreasonable search[es] and seizure[s]” (p. 770). “To 
think of the amendment as a right against general warrants disparages its 
intricacy. The amendment expressed not a single idea but a family of ideas 
whose identity and dimensions developed in historical context” (p. 770). 
Foremost among the Framers’ thinking was the abolition of general war-
rants, multiple-specific warrants, noctural searches, and no-knock forcible 
entries.  
B. Unsettled Search and Seizure Topics 
While Cuddihy’s research reveals widespread opposition during the 
framing era to general warrants, multiple-specific warrants, nocturnal en-
tries, and no-knock intrusions, his findings also show that other search and 
seizure concepts were extant, but not at the forefront of the Framers’  
consciousness when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Two areas that 
remained unsettled in 1791 were probable cause and search incident to ar-
rest.  
                                                                                                                      
 22. P. 750. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 (1995), the Court relied in part on this 
history to hold that the knock and announce rule is “a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 929.  
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1. Probable Cause 
Cuddihy concludes that ideas surrounding probable cause developed 
significantly between the 1750s and 1791. However, by the time of ratifica-
tion, probable cause did not have a single meaning and its definitions were 
sometimes conflicting. A nascent concept of probable cause developed be-
tween the late sixteen hundreds and 1750, but it did not yet require strong 
judicial sentryship. In Britain, Parliament controlled the development of 
probable cause through statutes (p. 423). By 1723, developments had been 
made through antismuggling acts, which required “formal complaints under 
oath,” and through excise acts, which called for declarations of “the grounds 
of . . . knowledge or suspicion” (p. 423). The colonies did not progress 
much further than Britain, with the greatest strides being made by Maryland 
and Massachusetts (pp. 425–26). Smallpox, clothing, and baggage searches 
began in the 1750s, followed by searches for military deserters, game 
poaching, and the excise, with the Massachusetts General Court requiring 
specific warrants for each (pp. 337–38). These laws, which Cuddihy asserts 
were the “direct statutory ancestors to the specific warrant clause,” required 
informants to swear under oath that “they knew of probable illegality at the 
place alleged,” though they did not allow judges to withhold warrants (pp. 
337–38). 
By the 1760s, British legal scholars and commentators had taken up dis-
cussion of probable cause and its requirements. William Blackstone argued 
for judicial discretion to issue arrest warrants, saying that a magistrate “is a 
competent judge of the probability offered to him of . . . suspicion” (p. 581; 
internal quotation marks omitted). Despite comments by Blackstone, Lon-
don Magazine, and other commentators, Cuddihy finds that these 
discussions represented the extreme of thought on probable cause, rather 
than the norm, and furthermore, that these ideas were not carried out in 
practice (p. 581).  
In 1764, the Sugar Act added a new dimension to probable cause in rela-
tion to warrantless seizures of ships. Section 46 of the Sugar Act precluded 
lawsuits by ship owners if a judge found probable cause retroactively (p. 
586). The inability to sue, even when ship owners had been financially dam-
aged by the seizures, led to discontent over the use of probable cause to 
protect officials from groundless seizures, and this discontent intensified as 
the power to search expanded to naval officers. Litigation over the Sugar Act 
often centered around the use of retroactive probable cause as a shield for 
customs officials, and lawsuits over two ship seizures, Henry Laurens’s Ac-
tive and John Hancock’s sloop Liberty, were widely publicized throughout 
the colonies (p. 590). While the discussion of probable cause relating to 
warrantless ship seizures did not itself create a cohesive understanding of 
probable cause, it does reveal that the concept had applicability in the case 
of both warrantless and warrant-required searches.23 
                                                                                                                      
 23. See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 
B.U. L. Rev. 925, 960–65 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, Complexity]. 
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State constitutions took the next step in the development of probable 
cause in the 1770s. In particular, Virginia’s constitution implemented a 
strong version of probable cause by requiring warrants be supported by 
“evidence of a fact committed.”24 Virginia’s formulation of search and sei-
zure doctrine influenced other state constitutions, and the Virginia 
convention’s proposal for the Fourth Amendment would become the “core 
recommendation” considered by James Madison.25 
Ultimately, Cuddihy finds that the meaning of probable cause remained 
unsettled and at odds with itself by 1791. The lack of a precise definition of 
probable cause is not surprising. Despite centuries of development, the con-
cept of probable cause “never occasioned the intensity or depth of thought, 
adjudication, and legislation” that general warrants had (p. 771). “Why de-
bate probable cause for a specific warrant to search one house when a 
general warrant laid entire towns open to government purview?” (p. 771). 
While legal commentators and state laws were advocating for judicial sen-
tryship, requiring findings of “due and satisfactory Cause and Suspicion” or 
“reasonable cause of suspicion,”26 Cuddihy concludes that these advance-
ments continued to be experimental and outside of normal practice (p. 756). 
Congressional acts also were equivocal, with the Collection Act of 1789 
providing no discretion to judges issuing warrants, while Hamilton’s Excise 
Act in 1791 required “reasonable cause of suspicion to be made out to the 
satisfaction of . . . [a] judge or justice” (p. 757; alteration in original, inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Textually, “probable” represented a looser 
standard than current formulations of “preponderance of the evidence,” or a 
“more-likely-than-not” standard. Finally, definitions of probable cause 
                                                                                                                      
 24. P. 604. Virginia’s Constitution of June 12, 1776 read, “That general warrants whereby an 
officer may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to 
seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported 
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted.” P. 604. 
 25. P. 686. In 1790, the Virginia convention recommended that the “national government 
restrict itself to specific warrants . . . [and also] ground them on formal informations under oath ‘of 
evidence of a fact committed.’ ” P. 686. The decision to exclude the phrase “of evidence of a fact 
committed” from the final draft of the Fourth Amendment is not discussed by Cuddihy, but has been 
found to be significant by Thomas Davies. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 703–06 (1999) (explaining that under the common law, criminal 
arrest or search warrants had to include an allegation that an offense “in fact” had occurred, as well 
as “probable cause of suspicion;” the absence of any requirement in the Fourth Amendment of “an 
allegation of an offense ‘in fact,’ seems geared specifically to customs searches and indicates the 
federal Framers’ specific concern with regulating revenue searches”). Professor Davies provides a 
thorough discussion on this topic in a recent article. See Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing 
Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and 
Search Power, L. & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2010, at 1, 1 (explaining that framing-era search or 
arrest authority depended upon a “foundational accusation” that a crime actually had been commit-
ted “in fact;” the legal principle that probable cause alone was sufficient justification for a 
warrantless arrest or search did not emerge until long after the framing era). 
 26. P. 756. Benjamin Gale, a Connecticut justice of the peace, advocated for warrants “based 
on oath, and obtainable only if the informant was of substantial character, spoke from direct knowl-
edge, and was not vindictively motivated,” while statutes in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey 
required judges to find “reasonable cause of suspicion.” Pp. 755–56.  
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ranged from “likely” to “possible” to “credible” (p. 757). By 1791, differing 
concepts of probable cause “remained in force.”27  
2. Search Incident to Arrest 
An official’s authority to search the surrounding location incident to an 
arrest warrant was another area of ambiguity in Fourth Amendment history.28 
Cuddihy’s research shows that most British legal experts assumed limits on 
searches incident to arrest (p. 578). For example, Chief Justice Charles Pratt 
“interpreted the common law as an implied prohibition of seizure incident to 
arrest” and insisted in 1763 that officers could “apprehend nothing but the 
Person” when effectuating an arrest (p. 578). However, here too, legal com-
mentary did not match actual practice, with arrest warrants occasioning “not 
just entry but searches and seizures . . . [which] occurred not only during 
arrests but in a spacious periphery about them” (pp. 578, 417–19). Doctrine 
on searches incident to arrest saw almost no development during the 1780s 
and by 1791 still remained unsettled or unstated (pp. 664, 768). 
Cuddihy credits the underdevelopment of the probable-cause standard 
and commentary on searches incident to arrest to the dominance of the gen-
eral warrant up until the early 1780s. It was not until 1782 that the specific 
warrant had gained enough ground to allow consideration of subtler aspects 
of search and seizure doctrine, and thus “aspects of search and seizure be-
yond general warrants became the objects of neither law nor ideology” (p. 
435). Before 1782, “general warrants had been the overriding threat to pri-
vacy and had siphoned off the commentary and thought that milder 
techniques of search and seizure might have attracted” (p. 771). It is there-
fore unsurprising that the doctrines surrounding probable cause and searches 
incident to arrest remained underdeveloped by 1791.  
C. The Limitations of a Historical Inquiry 
Probable cause and search incident to arrest may have remained under-
developed in 1791, but there are other topics where history provides scant 
insight on the Framers’ thinking about particular types of searches and sei-
zures. In the modern era, the Court has confronted cases concerning vehicle 
searches and searches of persons. Individuals, on and off the Court, have 
insisted that constitutional search and seizure doctrine be grounded on fram-
ing-era thinking. History, however, will not be helpful in resolving the 
                                                                                                                      
 27. P. 758. Like the Framers, the modern Court has not offered an exact definition of prob-
able cause. The Court has stated that “[a]rticulating precisely what . . . ‘probable cause’ mean[s] is 
not possible.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). The Court has instructed that 
probable cause and its counterpart “reasonable suspicion” should not be viewed as legal technicali-
ties. Instead, the Court has embraced a totality-of-the-circumstances model for determining whether 
probable cause exists in a particular case. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 28. The scope of an officer’s authority to search incident to arrest has remained an unpre-
dictable and controversial subject for the Court. See infra Part III.  
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questions presented by these cases because the historical record does not 
provide a sufficiently clear view of the Framers’ views. 
1. Vehicle Searches 
Evidence of a legal consensus for vehicle searches is nonexistent. Cud-
dihy finds that the Framers’ thoughts regarding vehicle searches are 
unknown, and neither legal rulings nor legislation provides answers (p. 767). 
In a footnote Cuddihy lays out the case law and legislation, which consists 
of three pieces of evidence.29 None of this evidence provides a full under-
standing of a framing-era consensus regarding vehicles.  
Moreover, the extent to which the Framers analogized searches of carts 
and wagons to warrantless searches of ships is “unknowable” (p. 767). The 
Collection Act of 1789 allowed ships to be searched without warrant, and 
Cuddihy identifies three possible reasons behind this exemption: (1) a ship’s 
mobility allowed for the removal of evidence while a warrant is being 
sought; (2) ships were commercial spaces; and (3) privacy was diminished 
by the number of shipmen in a small space (pp. 767–68). While twentieth 
century cases, such as Carroll v. United States,30 have cited mobility as the 
prime justification for warrantless ship and vehicle searches, Cuddihy con-
cludes it is not possible to determine the Framers’ thoughts on the 
constitutionality of warrantless searches of carts and wagons. 
2. Body Searches 
History is equally unhelpful in illuminating framing-era thought on per-
sonal searches. Cuddihy finds that body searches accompanying arrests “had 
been thoroughly established in colonial times, so much so that their consti-
tutionality in 1789 can not be doubted” (p. 752). However, after 1776, most 
evidence of personal searches separate from arrest had wartime origins and 
involved searches of Tories, not regular searches of citizens (p. 752). To the 
extent that war had led to personal searches, Cuddihy finds them an unreli-
able indicator of the Framers’ thought (p. 769). Legal treatises and 
commentary also provide little help. Benjamin Gale protested warrantless 
searches of highway travelers’ saddlebags, pockets, and carriages, saying it 
was better to trade a little with the enemy than suffer the loss of “essential 
rights of a Free State” (p. 752). Besides Gale’s comment, however, Cud-
                                                                                                                      
 29. P. 767 n.388. The historical record on “searches of carts and other wheeled conveyances 
is sparse.” P. 767 n.388. There was one trial in Albany, New York, Pretty v. Ankus, where a court 
upheld a seizure of contraband pelts found on a cart without discussing the legality of the search. P. 
767 n.388. Cuddihy also cites legislation enacted during the revolution “commanding searches of all 
suspicious wagons or conveyances.” P. 767 n.388. Finally, he cites a 1780 Pennsylvania court ruling 
“against a general warrant to search ships for deserters” and a 1768 Massachusetts attorney general 
opinion stating that the authority to observe the “unloading of ships did not extend to searches be-
low decks.” P. 767 n.388.  
 30. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (analogizing vehicles to ships, claiming vehicle and ship 
searches did not require warrants because they “can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion in which the warrant must be sought”).  
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dihy’s research unearths little additional data on personal searches. To the 
extent that judges would like to ground personal searches in history, Cud-
dihy finds that personal searches are another type of intrusion that received 
little attention during the framing era.  
D. Did the Framers Intend a General “Reasonableness” Standard? 
For the past few decades, members of the Court—most notably Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia—have insisted that an ad hoc “reason-
ableness” balancing model is the ultimate test for all search and seizure 
cases. Under this model, a Fourth Amendment claim is upheld only when 
police act irrationally. If the Court can identify any plausible goal or reason 
that promotes law enforcement interests, the police search or seizure is nor-
mally deemed reasonable. Proponents of this view repeatedly note that the 
text of the amendment, as well as the history surrounding its adoption, does 
not require that law enforcement officials obtain warrants prior to every 
search or seizure. Under this theory, the first clause, the Reasonableness 
Clause, declares a freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
second clause, the Warrant Clause, merely specifies the form and content of 
search and arrest warrants.  
The opposing view is the “warrant preference” rule. This view contends 
that the Warrant Clause modifies the first clause.31 Although not an absolut-
ist position, this theory holds that a warrant is a necessary precondition of a 
reasonable search, unless there is a compelling reason for proceeding with-
out one. While the warrant preference rule is not mandated by the text, 
proponents of this rule argue that history and the Framers’ experience with 
discretionary searches support the view that a search is unreasonable unless 
authorized by a judicial warrant.32  
Cuddihy’s research reveals that an ad hoc reasonableness standard was 
not envisioned by the Framers. According to Cuddihy, the concept of “un-
reasonable searches and seizures” was adopted by the Framers because they 
“shared a general consensus on what those categories were” (p. lxv). “Legis-
lation, case law, legal treatises, pamphlets, newspapers, constitutional 
debates, and correspondence in America during the 1780s condemned not 
only the general warrant but also certain other methods of search and sei-
zure so consistently that their constitutional designation as unreasonable 
would have been almost superfluous” (p. lxv). In the minds of the Framers, 
“categories of unreasonable search and seizure were both multiple and  
identifiable,” and a consensus existed regarding general warrants, multiple-
specific warrants, nocturnal searches, and no-knock entries (pp. 771–72). 
Despite the book’s in-depth review of the intellectual and political develop-
ments in search and seizure doctrine, the history unearthed by Cuddihy does 
                                                                                                                      
 31. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 70 (“[T]he framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 
‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute neces-
sity.”). 
MACLIN & MIRABELLA FTP PAGINATED B.DOC 3/7/2011 1:11:37 PM 
1062 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 109:1049 
 
not demonstrate the intention or evolution of a “reasonableness” theory for 
deciding cases.  
If one must identify a central concern of the Framers, Cuddihy’s find-
ings reveal that “reasonableness” was not the goal they had in mind. Instead, 
“[p]rivacy was the bedrock concern of the amendment, not general war-
rants” (p. 766). The concept of privacy from federal intrusion was shaped by 
centuries of promiscuous searches in Britain and the colonies, and is what 
the Framers endeavored to protect by adopting the Fourth Amendment (p. 
766). The Framers could not, in the year 1791, foresee modern search and 
seizure developments, and Cuddihy’s book indicates that if there is any 
guidance history can give us it is that the concept of privacy was at the fore-
front of the Framers’ thinking and should be in our minds as we encounter 
new Fourth Amendment cases. 
II. Scholarly Reaction 
Cuddihy’s detailed examination of framing-era sources has rightly gar-
nered much attention by criminal procedure scholars.33 Because history is 
“an argument without an end,”34 Cuddihy’s conclusions have unsurprisingly 
also prompted disagreements from Fourth Amendment scholars. This Part 
examines the writings of two scholars, Thomas Davies and Fabio Arcila, 
who have offered a different interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s his-
tory. 
A. Thomas Davies 
In 1999 Professor Thomas Davies published an article documenting his 
research and conclusions on the history of the Fourth Amendment.35 Over 
two hundred pages, Davies’s article is outstanding; it is one of the best arti-
cles ever written on the Fourth Amendment.36 Professor Wayne LaFave has 
described it as “the most comprehensive, balanced and objective treatment 
of the origins of the Fourth Amendment and their significance for contem-
porary interpretation of the Amendment.”37 When the Michigan Law Review 
celebrated its one hundredth anniversary, Professor Yale Kamisar selected 
Davies’s article as one of the best ever published in the journal.38 Like Cud-
                                                                                                                      
 33. A quick Westlaw search reveals that Origins and Original Meaning has been cited in at 
least 106 different law review articles.  
 34. Webster’s New World Dictionary of Quotable Definitions 259 (Eugene E. Brus-
sell ed., 2d ed. 1988) (quoting Pieter Geyl). 
 35. Davies, supra note 25. 
 36. Davies’s article is comparable with Anthony G. Amsterdam’s Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1974), and Yale Kamisar’s Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusion-
ary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 Creighton L. 
Rev. 565 (1983). 
 37. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.1(a), at 5 n.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 38. See Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on the Search 
and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1821, 1821 (2002). 
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dihy, Davies examined an enormous number of original sources. Indeed, 
Davies acknowledges that Cuddihy’s “thorough research” was of “immense 
value” to him, and that he learned much from Cuddihy’s work.39 However, 
Davies does disagree with several of Cuddihy’s conclusions.40 
It is impossible to summarize Davies’s article in a sentence or two. For 
present purposes, it is important to note that he concludes that “the Framers 
did not perceive the problem of search and seizure authority in the same 
way we now do.”41 According to Davies, the Framers were concerned “al-
most exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general 
warrants.”42 He finds “that the Framers understood ‘unreasonable searches 
and seizures’ simply as a pejorative label for the inherent illegality of any 
searches or seizures that might be made under general warrants,” and that 
they “did not address warrantless intrusions at all in the Fourth Amend-
ment.”43 Equally significant, Davies finds no historical evidence for 
interpreting the amendment as embodying a broad “reasonableness” con-
cept.44 Another central theme of Davies’s article is that nineteenth-century 
developments undermined the premises and expectations of the Framers 
regarding search and seizure law. Finally, Davies posits that any attempt to 
return to the original meaning “would subvert the larger purpose for which 
the Framers adopted the text; namely to curb the exercise of discretionary 
authority by officers.”45 Given his conclusions, Davies finds that Cuddihy’s 
work, along with the writings of Nelson Lasson, Akhil Reed Amar, and Tel-
ford Taylor, to be “seriously flawed” because they have “taken for granted 
that the Framers must have intended to create a comprehensive constitu-
tional standard or principle that would reach all searches or seizures 
conducted by officers, with or without warrant.”46  
Davies’s narrow view of the Framers’ intent means there are large areas 
of disagreement between him and Cuddihy. However, despite the significant 
differences, Cuddihy and Davies share common ground on the underlying 
vision of the Fourth Amendment and the extent to which history can provide 
guidance for modern search and seizure doctrine.  
                                                                                                                      
 39. Davies, supra note 25, at 569 n.40. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 551. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 736 (describing that history does not support either the warrant preference 
or the generalized-reasonableness construction, and that the latter theory “is especially distant from 
the Framers’ meaning”); id. (“There is no reason to think [the Framers] meant for ‘reasonableness’ 
to be understood as a flexible, relativistic standard for the exercise of discretionary authority.”). 
 45. Id. at 556. 
 46. Id. at 590 (citing Lasson, supra note 2; Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitu-
tional Interpretation: Search, Seizure, and Surveillance and Fair Trial and Free Press 
(1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994)). 
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1. Areas of Disagreement: What Did  
“Unreasonable Searches and Seizures” Mean to the Framers? 
Davies takes issue with Cuddihy’s historical analysis of the first clause 
of the amendment, arguing that Cuddihy has “finessed the absence of evi-
dence of a historical reasonableness standard by describing the entire 
development of Anglo-American search and seizure law leading up to the 
framing as though it constituted a development of an overarching ‘concept’ 
of unreasonable searches and seizures.”47 Instead, Davies writes that the 
amendment’s use of “unreasonable search and seizure” only prohibited 
searches of houses by general warrant and does not extend to broad catego-
ries of search and seizure.48  
a. Disagreement over the Appearance of  
“Unreasonable Searches and Seizures” 
Davies makes much of the fact that the phrase “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” first appeared in the Massachusetts constitution in 1780.49 The 
phrase’s late appearance in the framing era is an indication to Davies that a 
broad concept of reasonableness did not develop over a long period of 
time.50 Cuddihy replies that this interpretation ignores too much history. 
Cuddihy finds that the term “reasonable” or “unreasonable” was used in 
1447 when “leaders of the London Company of Tailors protested that offi-
cials of the Drapers’ Company had searched their houses ‘with outen matier 
[i.e., matter] or cause reasonable’ ” (p. 778; internal quotation marks omit-
ted). He also notes that in 1738 the Virginia legislature “forbade 
‘unreasonable seizures and distresses’ ” (p. 778). Cuddihy does concede, 
however, that before 1780 search and seizure was rarely described in terms 
of reasonableness (p. 778). Ultimately, Cuddihy believes that Davies’s focus 
on the use of the term “unreasonable” in 1780 improperly dismisses decades 
of historical evidence that gave meaning to the amendment’s principal 
clause.  
b. Disagreement over Whether the Fourth Amendment  
Only Covers Houses or Additional Locations 
Davies argues that, historically speaking, there is no broad concept of 
unreasonable search and seizures; the amendment was only intended to 
prohibit Congress from authorizing general searches of houses. The Fram-
                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. at 592 n.107. 
 48. Id. at 603. 
 49. Id. at 595. The Massachusetts clause begins, “[E]very subject has a right to be secure 
from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his posses-
sions.” Id. (alteration in original omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. at 595–96. Davies was responding to Cuddihy’s dissertation manuscript when he 
wrote The Original Fourth. In his book, Cuddihy responds to Davies in an afterword. P. 777.  
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ers “were concerned that legislation might make general warrants legal in 
the future, and thus undermine the right of security in person and house.”51 
As support for this thesis, Davies first looks at the concerns documented in 
pre-revolutionary controversies.52 He finds it significant that in Paxton’s 
Case, James Otis only argued for the illegality of general warrants in rela-
tion to homes and not as applied to warehouses or ships, even though Otis 
was representing merchants who were also owners of ships and  
warehouses.53 Furthermore, Davies notes other commentators of the  
period—John Dickinson, Samuel Adams, and William Henry Drayton—
only criticized writs of assistance as they applied to houses.  
Davies next looks to the treatment of commercial buildings during the 
framing era. He finds that there is little support for the belief that commer-
cial buildings were part of the original Fourth Amendment because, while 
there were complaints over general writs used on warehouses, “the record 
does not indicate that those complaints ever became part of the legal griev-
ance over general warrants.”54 The lack of legal arguments regarding 
commercial spaces is the “silence,” or the “dog that didn’t bark,” when deci-
phering the amendment’s original meaning.55 For Davies, the silence means 
that “the Framers understood legislative authority for official inspection of 
commercial premises did not violate any common-law principle comparable 
to the castle doctrine.”56 
Additionally, Davies finds ships were not listed in the first clause of the 
amendment for a good reason: the Framers believed admiralty law governed 
the regulation and inspection of ships.57 According to Davies, ship searches 
cannot be considered part of the original Fourth Amendment.58 Unlike Cud-
dihy, Davies does not find complaints of ship seizures, such as those of 
Henry Laurens and John Hancock, add to our knowledge of probable cause 
or serve as examples of opposition to general searches. Instead, Davies finds 
these episodes are examples of discontent over “ ‘customs racketeering’ in 
the form of hypertechnical application of customs rules or forfeiture pro-
ceedings based on perjured testimony from informers.”59  
These arguments and the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment covers 
only houses are at odds with Cuddihy’s findings. Cuddihy agrees the home 
was a primary focus of the Fourth Amendment and that the effects of  
                                                                                                                      
 51. Davies, supra note 25, at 590. 
 52. Id. at 601. 
 53. Id. at 601–02. 
 54. Id. at 608. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. The “castle doctrine” is the idea that a man’s house is his castle, protected from un-
wanted intrusions by the government. Castle doctrine played a large part in search and seizure 
rhetoric and was used to bolster arguments in Britain and the United States against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in the home. 
 57. Id. at 605–08. 
 58. Id. at 605. 
 59. Id. at 604. 
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general warrants and writs of assistance on the home incited the most dis-
cussion and discontent (p. 766). The concept of a man’s house being his 
castle held a significant place in framing-era rhetoric, and Cuddihy ac-
knowledges the importance of that concept (pp. lix–lxvi). However, he also 
asserts that ships, like commercial buildings, were intended to receive some 
level of protection (p. 746). In particular, Cuddihy finds that discontent over 
customs searches of ships shows that “Americans increasingly regarded not 
only houses but ships as castles” (p. 591). Cuddihy’s theory on searches of 
ships draws on federal legislation. He notes that section 20 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 “gave federal district courts ‘exclusive original cognizance of 
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ including over all 
seizures made under U.S. law on the high seas and in harbors” (p. 782). 
Thus, Cuddihy maintains, the problem with Davies’ view on ship searches is 
that probable cause had already been an essential inquiry under admiralty 
law, and that “Section 20 seems not to extinguish probable cause for mari-
time seizure but to afford potential for its operation” (p. 782). Cuddihy 
concedes, however, that the level of protection afforded ships and commer-
cial buildings was ambiguous, and that “[s]tructures [were] afforded the 
privacy of houses to the extent that they resembled them. Dwelling houses 
were castles, but ships were not, and places of business affecting the public 
interest were somewhere in between” (pp. 743–46). 
c. Disagreement over Whether Warrantless Searches Are Included  
in the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
Beyond issues of location covered by “unreasonable search and seizure,” 
Davies also argues that the amendment did not cover warrantless searches; it 
was intended to prevent the issuance of general warrants.60 To support the 
point, Davies scrutinizes common-law search and seizure doctrine; specifi-
cally, he analyzes the authority of peace officers to engage in warrantless 
searches. 
At the Fourth Amendment’s framing, Davies finds that the duties of 
peace officers were narrow. “Constables were expected to preserve order by 
keeping an eye on taverns, controlling drunks, apprehending vagrants, and 
responding to ‘affrays’ (fights) and other disturbances . . . .”61 An officer’s 
authority to make discretionary, warrantless arrests was very limited and 
required that he be certain of his facts.62 Warrantless searches were also very 
restricted. Absent exigency, common-law sources “did not identify any posi-
tive justification for a warrantless search of a house.”63 In order to conduct 
searches of houses officers had to be given orders from a justice of the 
                                                                                                                      
 60. Id. at 600–11. 
 61. Id. at 621. 
 62. See id. at 632–33.  
 63. Id. at 646.  
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peace.64 The only means a justice of the peace had for issuing instructions to 
officers was through a warrant.65 Silence regarding an officer’s warrantless 
authority to enter houses for arrests or search, coupled with warrant re-
quirements in order to direct their actions, leads Davies to conclude that the 
Framers understood searches and seizures could only be carried out by valid 
warrants.66 Therefore, Davies concludes, the Framers only sought to restrict 
searches and seizures by general warrant.67 
Cuddihy concedes that the Framers did conceive of some warrantless 
searches being constitutional, but finds that the “constitutional scope for a 
major category of those searches cannot be calibrated, however, because . . . 
the evidence [is] inadequate” (p. 768). The legality of some warrantless 
searches, however, does not dissuade Cuddihy from believing that the Fram-
ers considered most warrantless searches unreasonable. Cuddihy finds 
support for this belief in the history of ship searches (pp. 591–92), but also 
in reaction to excise searches which he claims were “almost synonymous” 
with warrantless searches (p. 780). Regarding house-to-house searches, 
Cuddihy says that warrantless and warrant-required house searches were 
“interwove[n] to the point of interpenetration” (p. 781). Therefore, where 
Davies finds silence, Cuddihy finds evidence. In particular, Cuddihy draws 
on three declarations by the Continental Congress regarding customs 
searches as support for his view that warrantless intrusions are covered by 
the amendment.68 Regarding legal commentators, Cuddihy says that “[o]f 
the fifteen pamphleteers and essayists who addressed search and seizure in 
the aftermath of the constitutional convention of 1787, nearly half . . . 
blasted warrantless house searches as well as general warrants” (pp. 780–
81). 
                                                                                                                      
 64. Id. at 623–24. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 649. Professor Steinberg disagrees with Davies’s argument regarding warrantless 
intrusions. Steinberg finds that “the lack of debate about warrantless house searches likely occurred 
because in early America, ‘the common law apparently provided no justification for a search of a 
house beyond the ministerial execution of a valid search warrant.’ In other words, everyone agreed 
that warrantless house searches were impermissible.” David E. Steinberg, The Original Understand-
ing of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 1051, 1082 n.230 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
 67. Davies, supra note 25, at 649–50. 
 68. P. 779. The first two declarations were made on October 21, 1774, and October 26, 1774, 
and were addressed to the American people and to King George III, respectively. P. 779. In one 
declaration, Congress “denounced the power of the Commissioners of Customs ‘to break open and 
enter houses without the authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal information.’ ” P. 779. 
The third declaration was also made on October 26, 1774, in which Congress described excises to 
Quebec as “ ‘the horror of all free states . . . the most odious of taxes’ whereby ‘insolent’ excise-men 
would enter ‘houses the scenes of domestic peace and comfort and called the castles of English 
subjects in the books of their law.’ ” P. 779 (alteration in original). 
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2. Agreement: The Use of History in Modern  
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Davies and Cuddihy clash over the concept of “unreasonable search and 
seizures” and spar over the scope of the amendment. Despite these opposing 
interpretations, we find their differences are less important than their agree-
ment on a larger point. When it comes to the question of how history can 
help the Supreme Court decide modern Fourth Amendment issues, Cuddihy 
and Davies share common ground.  
Like Cuddihy, Davies concludes that illuminating the amendment’s his-
tory has limits because the Framers could not have anticipated the 
developments that have occurred in search and seizure doctrine.69 Modern 
changes in criminal procedure, including the increase in police officer dis-
cretion and emphasis on legislative codes instead of the common law, have 
“destroyed the common-law premises that had grounded the Framers’ belief 
that a ban against general warrants would suffice to ensure the right to be 
secure in person and house.”70 Instead, Davies believes the “value of recov-
ering the authentic history of search and seizure doctrine lies largely in the 
broader prospective it provides.”71 
The broader prospective provided by an understanding of history that 
Davies identifies is not significantly different than Cuddihy’s identification 
of “privacy” as being the Framers’ main concern. The underlying vision of 
the amendment, according to Davies, is checking the discretionary power of 
law enforcement officials. The Framers “focused on banning general war-
rants because they perceived the general warrant as the only means by 
which discretionary search authority might be conferred.”72 Davies believes 
that “[i]f there is any term in the text that might be described as the core or 
essence of the provision, ‘right to be secure’ is the leading candidate.”73 
Modern interpretations of the amendment should not “render the right to be 
secure a practical nullity.”74 
B. Fabio Arcila 
Professor Fabio Arcila describes Cuddihy’s scholarship as “the leading 
historical account of the Fourth Amendment,”75 and it is evident from Ar-
                                                                                                                      
 69. Compare pp. 771–72, with Davies, supra note 25, at 724. 
 70. Davies, supra note 25, at 725. 
 71. Id. at 748. 
 72. Id. at 741. Davies continues: the Framers “did not mean to approve of, nor facilitate the 
development of, warrantless discretionary authority; rather, they did not conceive of the possibility 
that future generations would confer discretionary authority on ordinary officers by means other 
than general warrants.” Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History 
of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Arcila, Trenches]. 
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cila’s many articles that Cuddihy has been an influential starting point for 
Arcila’s research. Although Arcila recognizes Cuddihy’s contributions, the 
two arrive at different places after examining the historical record regarding 
probable cause.  
As an initial matter, Arcila agrees with Cuddihy that the historical record 
shows an unsettled and equivocal understanding of probable cause during 
the period between 1787 and 1825, which Arcila calls the “Framers’ era.”76 
Their conclusions diverge, however, on the question of judicial independ-
ence to issue warrants. For example, during the period between 1777 and 
1782, Cuddihy finds that judicial sentryship “was still the exception” and 
that many state statutes “made the granting of the warrant obligatory rather 
than optional” (p. 756). Around the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adop-
tion, Cuddihy concludes that “probable cause was in a state of flux” because 
two federal statutes—the Collection Act of 1789 and the Excise Act of 
1791—“embraced opposing concepts of judicial sentryship and different 
thresholds of reasonableness for search warrants” (p. 768). While the Col-
lection Act did not give magistrates discretion in administering warrants and 
placed legal obstacles in front of citizens in order to shield officers, the Ex-
cise Act of 1791 allowed for “reasonable cause of suspicion to be made out 
to the satisfaction of . . . [a] judge or justice” (p. 757). For Cuddihy, these 
opposing concepts of probable cause show “not one but several ‘original 
meanings [of] probable cause’ ” (p. 768).  
Arcila, on the other hand, ultimately concludes that judicial sentryship, 
although a goal articulated by the Framers, was not part of the day-to-day 
practice of ordinary justices of the peace who issued warrants. While identi-
fying an array of “legal elites” who advocated for the independence of 
judges, Arcila finds that “abundant reasons exist to believe that the  
non-elites who actually engaged in search warrant practice may not have 
followed” the guidance on judicial sentryship.77 He examines American jus-
tice-of-the-peace manuals, legal treatises, legal forms, and search warrant 
forms, which he finds “easily could have led justices of the peace to believe 
that a sentryship role was, at most, optional.”78 Looking beyond the  
                                                                                                                      
 76. Id. at 8. Regarding the meaning of probable cause during the framing era, Arcila writes 
that “the phrase ‘probable cause’ could easily have been equated with a mere unreasoned ‘hunch,’ 
rather than with a reasoned basis for belief grounded in an articulable set of underlying facts.” Id. at 
44. In a subsequent article, Arcila states that the concept of probable cause under the common law 
and in civil statutes remained “murky.” Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misun-
derstood Statutory History of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 363, 423 (2009) 
[hereinafter Arcila, Search Power]. 
 77. Arcila, Trenches, supra note 75, at 24. 
 78. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). Arcila notes that the concept of judicial sentryship “may 
have significantly influenced the Framers and other elites of the legal profession. But evidence 
suggests that probable-cause sentryship may well have been treated quite differently in the lower 
courts, where non-elites implemented search and seizure law on a daily basis.” Id. at 55. David 
Steinberg has taken issue with Arcila’s treatment of judicial sentryship, finding that “Arcila de-
scribes warrant review in the black-and-white terms of ‘sentryship’ and ‘ministerial,’ [when] in truth, 
review of warrants probably often fell somewhere in the large gray area in between.” David E. 
Steinberg, Probable Cause, Reasonableness, and the Importance of Fourth Amendment History: A 
Response to Professor Arcila, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1211, 1216 (2007). Furthermore, Steinberg 
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provisions of the Collection and Excise Acts to other framing-era civil-
search statutes, Arcila concludes that the Excise Act’s probable-cause  
formulation was exceptional and did not represent the Framers’ views.79 
Thus, like Cuddihy, Arcila finds framing-era probable-cause doctrine to be 
unsettled. But Arcila argues that judges “may not” have exercised independ-
ence when issuing warrants,80 and therefore concludes that judicial 
sentryship was not a major part of the original understanding of probable 
cause. In a later article, Arcila contends that it is not clear whether judges 
“would have inquired into the grounds of probable cause if, as was often the 
case, such information was not initially available.”81 He also argues that be-
cause probable cause could be established by flimsy allegations during the 
framing era, the concept of probable cause did not offer “a meaningful level 
of search or seizure protection.”82  
Arcila and Cuddihy also disagree on whether probable cause was re-
quired for warrantless searches. Unlike Cuddihy, who finds suspicion 
requirements for general searches of ships indicative of an evolving idea of 
probable cause, Arcila finds that the “Framers knew how to statutorily re-
quire prior suspicion, but consciously chose not to impose such a 
requirement for maritime customs searches.”83 While Cuddihy is unwilling 
to draw conclusions about the status of probable cause at the time of fram-
ing, Arcila reads history as confirming that probable-cause and suspicion 
requirements were not required to legitimize warrantless searches.84 Indeed, 
he states that as a matter text and history, “[t]he Framers never intended for 
the Fourth Amendment to impose any generalized suspicion requirement.”85 
Arcila believes his historical conclusions help provide an answer to 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to make a search consti-
tutional. Specifically, Arcila contends his findings on the meaning of judicial 
sentryship and probable cause undermine arguments for the “warrant prefer-
ence” rule.86 While Arcila concedes that the suspicion and probable-cause 
                                                                                                                      
says that probable cause has always been a “fluid concept” that has evolved over time and that Ar-
cila’s characterization of probable cause dismisses the “clear trend . . . toward a thorough review 
process.” Id. at 1216–17.  
 79. Arcila, Search Power, supra note 76, at 410–11 (“Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act is not 
broadly representative of the Framers’ views for two reasons. First, the model it represented . . . is 
quantitatively rare, having been followed . . . in only three subsequent statutory acts, for a total of 
four. By contrast, the 1789 Collection Act model . . . was followed in at least 32 subsequent statu-
tory acts, for a total of 33.”). 
 80. Arcila, Trenches, supra note 75, at 55. 
 81. Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1275, 1312 (2010) 
[hereinafter Arcila, Death of Suspicion]. 
 82. Id. at 1314.  
 83. Id. at 1298–99. 
 84. Id. at 1303. 
 85. Id. at 1294. But cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Framers strongly opposed general searches without par-
ticularized suspicion); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 483, 528–29 (1995) (same). 
 86. See generally Arcila, Death of Suspicion, supra note 81. 
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requirements protect against governmental overreaching, he nevertheless 
asserts that the aggressive judicial sentryship that supporters of the Warrant 
Clause argue for is “at odds with an historical understanding of probable 
cause, in which it is likely that sentryship took an aggressive form only in-
consistently at best, and may have often ranged from lax to essentially  
non-existent.”87 Arcila believes that history supports an interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment that comports with a “reasonableness” balancing  
model.88 
By concluding that evidence of weaker probable-cause standards implies 
the primacy of the Reasonableness Clause, Arcila dismisses the important 
points that Cuddihy’s (and Davies’) research reveals. Despite his review of 
thousands of sources, Cuddihy’s book does not reveal a developing concept 
of general reasonableness in the framing era as Arcila argues. As noted 
above, Cuddihy concludes that the term “unreasonable search and seizure” 
was not meant as a broad concept, but consisted of specific categories of 
search and seizure that had gained a consensus by 1791. Finally, Cuddihy’s 
review of history identifies an overarching principle of curbing government 
search and seizure discretion.89 These findings undercut the view that the 
amendment was intended to embody a general reasonableness model.  
III. The Supreme Court and Fourth Amendment History  
The Fourth Amendment’s deep roots in the framing era mean that his-
tory inevitably has a certain attraction for some Justices when deciding 
search and seizure issues. Of all of the Justices who have served on the 
Court, Felix Frankfurter stands out as the one who “sought the fourth 
amendment’s meaning in its history”90 Fittingly, a practice known to the 
Framers—unrestrained police searches of homes and businesses incident to 
arrest—prompted some of Frankfurter’s most memorable statements about 
history and the Fourth Amendment.91 Frankfurter’s reflections were an im-
portant part of a nearly century-long debate among the Justices over the 
scope of an officer’s authority to search incident to arrest. Starting in the late 
1920s and continuing through the late 1960s, the Justices argued about the 
authority of the police to search premises in which an arrest was made.  
                                                                                                                      
 87. Arcila, Trenches, supra note 75, at 59. 
 88. Arcila endorses Professor Amar’s claim that the Fourth Amendment is simply about 
“reasonableness.” Arcila, Death of Suspicion, supra note 81, at 1294–95 (citing Amar, supra note 
46, at 782–85). Amar’s assertions have been thoroughly critiqued in numerous articles, including in 
Cuddihy’s afterword, and so will not be recounted here. Pp. 773–82; see also Davies, supra note 25; 
Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That 
Wrong Road Again”, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559 (1996); Maclin, Complexity, supra note 23.  
 89. Interestingly, Arcila states that “[l]imiting governmental discretion is probably the core 
Fourth Amendment value.” Arcila, Death of Suspicion, supra note 81, at 1326. 
 90. Amsterdam, supra note 36, at 397. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68–69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156–57 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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In 1981, the Justices fought over the power of the police to search vehi-
cles incident to the arrest of a vehicle’s occupant. New York v. Belton held 
that when police arrest the occupant of a car, they may, “as a contemporane-
ous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile.”92 In the Court’s latest rulings, Arizona v. Gant93 and Thornton v. 
United States,94 the Justices were divided over an officer’s authority to 
search a car incident to the arrest of the driver. Thornton extended Belton 
and ruled that police could search the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to the arrest of a person who had exited the vehicle. Gant, on the 
other hand, signaled a retreat from the direction of Belton and Thornton. 
Written by Justice Stevens, who sharply criticized the reasoning and hold-
ings in Belton and Thornton, Gant announced a two-part holding: First, the 
Court held that the rule of Belton does not permit a search of a car “after the 
arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle” at 
the time of the search. Second, adopting the rule Justice Scalia urged in his 
concurrence in Thornton, Gant concluded that “circumstances unique to the 
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehi-
cle.”95 
In Thornton and Gant, Justice Scalia endeavored to have history guide 
his vote. In Gant, Scalia stated that “the historical scope of officers’ author-
ity to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain.”96 Because of this 
uncertainty, Justice Scalia looked to “traditional standards of reasonable-
ness,” and concluded “a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto 
‘reasonable’ only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for 
which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable 
cause to believe occurred.”97 Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the historical 
scope of an officer’s authority to search a vehicle incident to arrest is “un-
certain” is fairly consistent with Cuddihy’s findings, but the approaches 
taken by Scalia and Cuddihy to reach this conclusion are noticeably differ-
ent. 
Justice Scalia states that “numerous earlier authorities” support a general 
interest in seizing evidence relevant to the crime for which the suspect has 
been arrested.98 However, Scalia only cites mid-nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century sources to support his claim. He concedes that historical 
sources support a “narrower focus” of an officer’s search incident to arrest 
authority and he cites a 1758 essay on a constable’s power and the influen-
                                                                                                                      
 92. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
 93. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 94. 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 95. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Id. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 1724–25. 
 98. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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tial ruling in Entick v. Carrington.99 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia finds that 
either a general interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest 
or a narrow rule restricting an officer’s search authority to preventing con-
cealment or destruction of evidence “are plausible accounts of what the 
Constitution requires.”100 Because he finds “uncertainty” regarding the his-
torical scope of an officer’s power to search vehicles incident to arrest, 
Justice Scalia is willing to allow a general interest in evidence gathering to 
determine the outcome in Thornton and Gant. 
Justice Scalia provides scant evidence on the Framers’ view of a consta-
ble’s power to search locations incident to arrest. Nor does he acknowledge 
the absence of evidence concerning the Framers’ thinking on searches of 
wagons and carts. In fact, he offers “no historical evidence that automatic 
searches of places near arrestees for evidence of their crimes was, or would 
have been, acceptable to those who designed and adopted constitutional pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”101 
In contrast to Scalia’s analysis, Cuddihy’s determinations concerning an 
officer’s authority to search a location incident to arrest are specifically fo-
cused on the framing era. During the pre-revolutionary period, legal 
commentators did not recognize a constable’s power to search an arrestee’s 
home incident to arrest. Cuddihy explains that the “legal authors of 1761–76 
agreed that houses could be broken into to consummate the arrest process, 
but they did not also say that houses could be searched during that process” 
(p. 578). “The assumption of most legal authorities, in other words, was that 
arrests and arrest warrants were not excuses to conduct general searches” (p. 
578). Furthermore, in 1763, Chief Justice Charles Pratt, the author of Entick 
v. Carrington, “interpreted the common law as an implied prohibition of 
seizure incident to arrest” (p. 578). Pratt told William Pitt that while houses 
could be forcibly entered in cases involving felonies and flagrant situations, 
“the arresting officer could ‘apprehend nothing but the Person’ and thereby 
assumed that houses afforded privacy even in exigent circumstances” (p. 
578). To be sure, constables did not always follow the teachings of framing-
era legal experts; arrest warrants were occasionally used as means to con-
duct wide-ranging searches and seizures of homes and other premises (pp. 
578, 419). In sum, “the arrest process permitted searches and seizures of 
vast scope in 1776,” but a consensus was emerging among legal authorities 
that such intrusions “should be restrained” (p. 579).  
Cuddihy reports that, after Independence, the scope of an officer’s power 
to search incident to arrest remained unsettled. Between 1783 and 1789, 
neither the results from reported trials nor contemporaneous legal treatises 
had defined an officer’s power to search a location incident to arrest.  
According to Cuddihy, “[T]reatises and cases said only that officials could 
                                                                                                                      
 99. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). Entick held invalid the seizure of private papers pursuant to a 
search warrant. P. 453–58. 
 100. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 101. James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest 
Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1417, 1459. 
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force open doors to serve arrest warrants, not if they could search after 
achieving entrance or how far” (p. 768). Therefore, although the historical 
sources of the framing era did not definitively resolve the question that we 
confront today, “[t]he men who wrote and ratified the Fourth Amendment 
assumed some ambit of search-incident-to-arrest, but they neglected to an-
nounce its perimeter” (p. 769). 
Concededly, the quality and breadth of Cuddihy’s study has not been 
previously available to the Justices. Before Cuddihy, the Court cited Telford 
Taylor’s book as support for a broad interpretation of an officer’s power to 
search a home incident to arrest.102 Taylor claimed that the search of an “ar-
restee’s person and premises is as old as the institution of arrest itself,” and 
that this practice had “the full approval of bench and bar, in the time of 
George III.”103 Indeed, Taylor wrote that there is “no evidence” that the per-
sons who wrote the federal and early state constitutions “had in mind 
warrantless searches incident to arrest.”104 The “original understanding” was 
that such searches “were quite normal and, in the language of the fourth 
amendment, ‘reasonable.’ ”105  
Cuddihy’s findings undermine Taylor’s assertion that there is “no evi-
dence” that the Framers thought about searches incident to arrest. In 
addition, Davies has demonstrated the historical weakness of Taylor’s posi-
tion. Davies’s research reveals that the common law recognized search 
warrants for stolen goods and permitted the seizure of “weapons or stolen 
property from the ‘possession’ of an arrestee as an ‘incident’ of a lawful 
arrest made with or without a warrant,” but that “those appear to have been 
the only forms of search authority recognized in framing-era common 
law.”106 Davies has documented that the “[r]eported decisions regarding the 
allowable scope of search incident to arrest first became evident in court 
records during the late nineteenth century.”107 He believes that the likely ex-
planation for why courts started questioning police power to search a home 
or business incident to arrest was not that authority to search incident to ar-
rest was taken for granted prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, 
as Taylor asserts, but rather that state officers in the late 1800s had obtained 
ex officio power to make warrantless arrests and officers began “testing the 
limits of their expanded authority to make warrantless arrests and war-
rantless searches incident to them.”108 
Justice Scalia’s use of history in Thornton and Gant illustrates the pit-
falls of deciding modern Fourth Amendment issues with a historical 
                                                                                                                      
 102. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233 n.3 (1973) (citing Taylor, supra note 46, 
at 44–45).  
 103. Taylor, supra note 46, at 28–29. 
 104. Id. at 39. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Davies, supra note 25, at 627. 
 107. Id. at 638 n.250. 
 108. Id.  
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analysis. But if the Court is adamant—as Scalia declared in Houghton—
about consulting the Framers’ thinking on the subject of search incident to 
arrest, we believe that judges only make things worse by focusing on spe-
cific historical legal practices in order to identify the “original meaning” of 
the Fourth Amendment. “First, it is important to distinguish—as Justice 
Frankfurter did—between the use of background history to establish that the 
Framers of the Bill of Rights meant to limit or forbid a particular evil, and 
the use of background history to support the negative inference that they did 
not.”109  
Another problem with focusing on specific historical practices “is that 
modern judges have not been particularly successful in recounting the con-
tent of framing-era law.”110 Cuddihy’s scholarship reveals that the history of 
search and seizure law in Britain and America is too complex and insuffi-
ciently developed to provide clear answers for today’s cases.111 Rather than 
deciding cases based on an enigmatic “original intent,” a better approach is 
to focus on the underlying value that the Framers sought to embrace when 
the Fourth Amendment was proposed. As one distinguished historian has 
written, “Bills of rights were educational documents; they provided the 
standards of certainty that enabled citizens to assess doubtful acts of gov-
ernment; and they worked best by inculcating the values they espoused 
among the people and their rulers.”112 We know from Cuddihy’s work that 
the Framers wanted to protect privacy and control the discretionary search 
power of officials. That “original intent” cautions against allowing police 
the power to search a car incident to arrest of an occupant in the absence of 
probable cause. 
Conclusion 
The Fourth Amendment was adopted because the Framers experienced 
the suppression of liberty that came with discretionary searches and sei-
zures. They knew that the privilege from unreasonable searches and seizures 
was essential to a free society. As Professor Kamisar rightly noted, “What 
good is freedom of speech or freedom of religion or any other freedom if 
law enforcement officers have unfettered power to violate a person’s privacy 
and liberty when he sits in his home or drives his car or walks the streets?”113  
For those who want to study the history of search and seizure law, Cud-
dihy’s book “is the most ambitious history of the Fourth Amendment’s 
origins yet undertaken by a professional historian”—it is “essential  
                                                                                                                      
 109. Amsterdam, supra note 36, at 397–98. 
 110. Davies, supra note 25, at 742. 
 111. See Cloud, supra note 8, at 1746. 
 112. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution 324 (1996). 
 113. Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment And Its Exclusionary Rule, The Champion, 
Sept./Oct. 1991, at 20, 21. 
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reading.”114 Cuddihy’s meticulous research provides a comprehensive under-
standing of the strengths and limits of a Fourth Amendment historical 
argument. His work helped to shape the last two decades of Fourth Amend-
ment historical scholarship and will continue to do so with the publishing of 
Origins and Original Meaning. Anyone who studies Cuddihy’s book will 
emerge with a better understanding of why freedom was central to the Fra-
mers’ intent. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Cloud, supra note 8, at 1710, 1712–13. 
